Suppose you and your friend have a horse race between horse A and horse B. You are all aware that you are just as good at judging this kind of business. The race is contested, and each of you makes independent judgments about the winner. You are very confident that horse A has won, while your friend is very confident that horse B has won. The two of you then discover your disagreement For the right reasons, the two evidence of the higher order (ii) and (iii) must be weighted in the same way. After weighing (ii) and (iii) in the same way, they neutralize throughout my body of proof to you. With (ii) and (iii) neutralized, however, I still have (i) and I`m right to believe what (i) supports. The good reason for the view then finds that what I have the right to believe in “ (t) and what I am allowed to believe in you is exactly the same. In both cases, what I should believe is quite a question of what is being argued, so in a case of disagreement with his peers, what matters is what the first-rate evidence supports. If I believed in accordance with my evidence to “ (t), then t_2 changes the learning of disagreement. After correctly answering my reasons for „t,“ nothing epistemérique changes my attitude towards .

(P) should have. The conversation goes in the direction of a discussion about who can be called „epistemic Peer“, someone similar in the ability to argue and access to evidence to another. One of the criteria for considering someone as such, Jennifer says, is a motivation to discover the truth. However, a caller says that even if someone is not your episteric peer, you still can`t reject your faith if the result is relevant to you. Ken wonders if there might be a dark side to the idea of attributing epistemic Peers. Can`t you just isolate your beliefs by excluding others as epistemic Peers? Jennifer agrees; For example, a religious person cannot regard a non-religious person as having knowledge of the same evidence and therefore cannot be qualified to be considered an episteric peer. Suppose I think global warming is going on. Suppose I also think that Taylor is my peer with respect to “ (B): I think we are just as likely to judge correctly“ (B). I have this opinion of Taylor because I claim that she knows as well that I do the basic facts about the consensus of experts, she understands and respects that consensus about as much as I do, and she based her opinion of “ (B) on those facts.

(I know she has an opinion on „B,“ but I haven`t heard her voice yet.) Therefore, I think they have my chance to go along. (B) is. So there are differences of opinion on what to believe and what to do. Despite this distinction, we can achieve a certain simplicity and uniformity by establishing differences of opinion on what to do as a disagreement on what we should believe.